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“THE TWISTED HANDIWORK OF EGYPT” AND 
HEIDEGGER’S QUESTION CONCERNING CULTURE 
 
 
In the first paragraph of his essay “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger says 
something of utmost importance for and about our times. In this paper, I want to 
say why this is the case. The paragraph reads:i 
In metaphysics reflection [die Besinnung] is accomplished concerning the 
essence [das Wesen] of what is [des Seienden] and a decision [eine 
Entscheidung] takes place regarding the essence of truth [das Wesen der 
Wahrheit]. Metaphysics grounds an age [ein Zeitalter], in that through a 
specific interpretation of what is [eine bestimmte Auslegung des Seienden] 
and through a specific comprehension of truth [eine bestimmte Auffassung 
der Wahrheit] it gives to that age the basis [Grund] upon which it is 
essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the 
phenomena [Erscheinungen] that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order 
that there may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena 
themselves, the metaphysical basis for them must let itself be apprehended 
in them. Reflection is the courage [der Mut] to make the truth of our own 
presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most 
deserve to be called in question. (AWP 115; 75) 
Before we get to this critical paragraph itself, we need to think about the title “The 
Age of the World Picture” and its several terms, as well as about the expression 
“our times.” First, the title: the days of the fashionability of the term “world 
picture” are, as I write at the start of the 21st century, long gone. That term seems 
to us, today, to mark an historicism that is already an item for investigation by the 
history of ideas. It may have begun with Spengler, but it had its heyday among 
such writers as Karl Mannheim (“On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung”),  
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E.M.W Tillyard (The Elizabethan World Picture), Lucien Goldmann (The Hidden 
God and its “vision du monde”) and Michel Foucault (The Order of Things and 
its “epistémé”), not to mention the whole detour through “ideology.”ii And no 
doubt the great forebear of the “world picture” is Herder’s Volksgeist.iii But 
cultural historicism is far from Heidegger’s sights as he levels this first paragraph 
of a paper about the age of the world picture. Still less, by employing the word 
“age” or “time” (die Zeit), is he trying to out-historicise this historicism by, as it 
were, simply confining it to its own age or time. This is, then, far from a kind of 
meta-historicism. 
 
The age or time that Heidegger does bring before us in this essay is no less than 
the whole of modernity (Neuzeit), the new age, the new time. And its inception is 
marked, as in so many instances for Heidegger, by the Cartesian cogito. The time 
or age, then, is the time from Descartes’ Meditations (1641)--perhaps even before--
to Heidegger’s present (1938)--perhaps even beyond. And what marks this age of 
modernity is its world picture. But, if this is not the world picture of the 
historicists, then what? 
 
This age of modernity, for Heidegger, is a time in which there simply is a world 
picture; or, rather, in which the world becomes a picture: “The fundamental event 
of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture” [Der Grundvorgang 
der Neuzeit ist die Eroberung der Welt als Bild] (AWP 134; 94). So, “world 
picture” is to be read as “world as picture.” And, perhaps echoing Schopenhauer 
via Nietzsche, the world as picture is equivalent to the world as representation. 
The difference, however, is that while Schopenhauer makes an explicit 
philosophy on the grounding idea that “The world is my representation”iv --that 
everything that is is an object for a subject and nothing more (such that things can 
never be, strictly, “in themselves”)--Heidegger gives this “picturing” an entirely 
different status. With Heidegger, the picturing relation to the world, the  
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“philosophy of representation,” is always already implicit in all the thinking of 
modernity from Descartes to Nietzsche. Schopenhauer’s explicitation of it--which 
he calls “this thought . . . which has been sought for a very long time under the 
name of philosophy, and . . . whose discovery is for this very reason regarded by 
those versed in history just as impossible as the philosophers’ stone”v--is merely 
that, an explicitation, hence no discovery and certainly no philosophers’ stone. 
What Schopenhauer explicits, if Heidegger is right, every thinker of modernity 
must, at ground, necessarily think. This, then, is the age in which the world has 
become a picture, a representation. What does this mean? 
 
Derrida is lyrically sceptical of Heidegger’s claim, in this very essay (“The Age of 
the World Picture”) about the possibility of the totalisation of modern thought by 
representational thinking. He asks, in effect, if the collection of all thought (at least 
in our times, in modernity) by a single term is not, itself, a kind of totalisation. He 
asks whether:vi 
. . . in the very interior of what offers itself as the philosophical or merely 
theoretical usage of the word [“]representation[”], the unity of some 
semantic center, which would give order to a whole multiplicity of 
modifications and derivations, is to be presumed. (SOR 320) 
And, even if it is not to be presumed, then some other, even less definite, unity 
must underpin the thought (attributable to Heidegger) that all modern thought is 
representational. This may have to do with thought in general, in its essence, and 
it certainly has to do with all “collecting” and “grouping” together. Derrida refers 
to it as the envoi, the sending, a sending forth with no guarantee of arriving--
perhaps even of arriving at such a definite concept as representation as the figure 
of our particular epoch. And so: 
In order for the epoch of representation [= the age of the world picture] to 
have its sense and its unity as an epoch, it must belong to the grouping 
(rassemblement) of a more original (originaire) and more powerful envoi.  
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And if there had not been the grouping of this envoi, the Geschick [fate, 
destiny]vii of being, if this Geschick had not announced itself from the start 
as the Anwesenheit [presence] of being, no interpretation of the epoch of 
representation would come to order it in the unity of a history of 
metaphysics. . .. This grouping is the condition, the being-together of what 
offers itself to thought in order for an epochal figure--here that of 
representation--to detach itself in its contour and order itself in its rhythm 
in the unity of a destination, or rather a “destinality,” of being. (SOR 321) 
This is a significant statement whether we position Derrida, at this point, as 
disciple or as critic of Heidegger. Here a critical part of the Heideggerian 
vocabulary is used to alert us to its author’s proposal of a “unity” lying behind 
every “epochal figure” such as, for Heidegger, representation. Here Derrida 
discovers and homes in on the centre, not only of Heideggerian philosophy, but 
also of Heidegger’s history of metaphysics which, arguably, is the raison d’être 
for his counter-representationalist analytic of being. Heidegger himself explains 
the question of sending/destining, in “The Question Concerning Technology” as 
follows:viii 
The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that 
revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, 
becomes standing-reserve [Bestand]. “To start upon a way” means “to 
send” in our ordinary language. We shall call that sending-that-gathers 
[versammelde Schicken] which first starts man upon a way of revealing, 
destining [Geschick]. (QCT 24) 
Accordingly, any kind of revealing (and below, we shall mention the particular 
kind that technological, cultural and representational thinking are, conjointly, for 
Heidegger) is, in essence, a starting upon a way, a sending, an envoi. And, as 
Derrida goes on to say “It is in basing itself on this grouped indivisibility of the 
envoi that Heidegger’s reading can single out (détacher) epochs, including the 
most dangerous of all, the epoch of representation in modern times” (SOR 322).  
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But does this indivisibility (does any indivisibility) hold? Derrida thinks 
otherwise: 
If there has been representation, it is perhaps (and Heidegger would 
recognize this) just because the envoi of being was originally menaced in its 
being-together, in its Geschick, by divisibility or dissension (what I would 
call dissemination). Can we not then conclude that if there has been 
representation, the epochal reading Heidegger proposes for it becomes, in 
virtue of this fact, problematic from the beginning, at least as a normative 
reading (and it wishes to be this also), if not as an open questioning of what 
offers itself to thought beyond the problematic, and even beyond the 
question as a question of being, of a grouped destiny or of the envoi of 
being [?] (SOR 322-23) 
And so, representational thinking, as the way of characterising the history of 
modern metaphysics, itself becomes, under Derrida’s account, not only a kind of 
totalisation but one founded on “the grouping of a more original and more 
powerful envoi.” Behind the idea that all modern ideas of presence (Anwesenheit) 
must be representational (that they must involve, primarily, man-as-subject 
taking what is as an object) lies a “sending” (envoi) that guarantees it. And this 
sending is, despite appearing as a unity, in fact “menaced” from the start by 
“divisibility or dissension,” by “dissemination.” And we know, from much of the 
rest of Derrida’s work (and not least his “Envois”), that what is being found here 
is the central idea that no starting upon a way, no sending forth of anything to its 
destiny, is guaranteed to arrive. It may indeed arrive; but the absence of a 
guarantee always shows that what would be destining (Geschick) is always also 
accompanied, at the moment and event of its sending forth, by a-destining. 
 
But, there is also a crucial sense in which this very “sending,” this envoi, the 
disseminational envoi of Derrida’s philosophy--complete with its critical a-
destinality (and this is important)--is itself an integral part of the counter- 
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representational philosophy that Heidegger announces as early as Being and 
Time.ix So, to paraphrase Derrida (SOR 322), my question then is the following, 
and I formulate it too quickly: might it also be said that without this philosophy 
(or, at least, without one extremely like it) there would be no possibility of the 
envois that grounds the Derridean critique of the “centrality” of representation to 
Heidegger’s history of metaphysics? 
 
To put this another way: how can “sending” (envois) be seen at work in Being 
and Time and, moreover, precisely at the point of that early work’s critique of 
representation? While this is hard to read off either the German or the English 
text, an early and celebratory reading by Derrida’s mentor and fellow 
countryman, Emmanuel Levinas, brings this to light. What Heidegger reads as the 
picturing or representationalist version of thinking man’s relation to the world, 
Levinas refers to, more narrowly perhaps, as “idealism.” The fact that Heidegger 
and Levinas mean much the same thing by these terms is clear from the following 
passage of Levinas’s careful reading:x 
The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific 
position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two 
kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which 
the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original 
aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, 
does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects--considered as ideas 
and contents of thought--are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order 
to make sense of this paradox, Descartes had to invoke the existence of a 
veridical god who guaranteed the correspondence between things and 
ideas. Furthermore, he had to reflect on truth’s method and criteria--a 
reflection and preoccupation endemic to modern philosophy. Such 
reflection [presumably, for example, the Cartesian version of the Besinnung 
announced by Heidegger at the start of this paper] is a basic requirement  
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for subjectivity enclosed within itself which must search within its own 
interior for signs of its conformity with being. From there, it is but a step to 
idealism. Henceforth, the thinking substance will not have to reunite with 
extended substance; it will recover that extended substance within itself. 
The subject itself will constitute its own object. Idealism comes to be one of 
the consequences both of the Cartesian cogito and of the theories of 
knowledge whose flourishing has been fostered by this new conception of 
the subject. (MHO 12) 
Clearly, this is the move in the history of metaphysics that Heidegger, throughout 
his work (including “The Age of the World Picture”), refers to as the positioning 
of man as sub-iectum, a positioning characteristic of modernity and its several 
related types of thinking (technological, scientific, cultural and so forth). 
Heidegger characterises this move, characteristically enough, firstly in terms of 
the idea of the sub-iectum in general and secondly in terms of the version of it 
that is particular to modernity (the version that happens, without any necessity, 
to place man in this position): 
What is decisive [with modernity] is not that man frees himself to himself 
from previous obligations, but that the very essence of man itself changes, 
in that man becomes subject. We must understand this word subiectum, 
however, as the translation of the Greek hypokeimenon. The word names 
that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself. 
This metaphysical meaning of the concept of the subject has first of all no 
special relationship to man and none at all to the I. (AWP 128; 88; final 
emphasis added) 
Derrida knows this much about the cruciality of the sub-iectum to Heidegger’s 
theory of the centrality of representation in the history of modern metaphysics; 
indeed, he refers to it (SOR 314). What his discussion of the terms 
“representation” and Vorstellung, however, does not sufficiently emphasise, 
though it is crucial to Heidegger’s account, is the historically specific event that  
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arises in metaphysics when the sub-iectum (which “has first of all no special 
relationship to man”) becomes, actually, in fact, as a particular historical event 
(Ereignis), narrowed down to the human domain: 
However, when man becomes the primary and only real [ersten und 
eigentlichen] subiectum, that means: Man becomes that being upon which 
all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man 
becomes the relational center of that which is as such. But this is possible 
only when the comprehension of what is as a whole changes. In what does 
this change manifest itself? What, in keeping with it, is the essence of the 
modern age? (AWP 128; 88)xi 
In Derrida’s version of this historical shift to modernity, incredibly accurate 
though it is, the becoming-man of the sub-iectum as such is not mentioned. 
Instead, the historical shift is discussed solely in terms of “picture” and 
“representation”: 
If we follow Heidegger, the Greek world did not have a relation to what-is 
as to a conceived image or a representation (here Bild). There what-is is 
presence; and this did not, at first, derive from the fact that man would 
look at what-is and have what we call a representation (Vorstellung) of it as 
the mode of perception of a subject. In a similar way, in another age . . . the 
Middle Ages relates itself essentially to what-is as to an ens creatum. “To 
be something that-is” (“être-un-étant”) means to belong to the created 
order; this thus corresponds to God according to the analogy of what-is 
(analogia entis), but, says Heidegger, the being of what-is never consists in 
an object (Gegenstand) brought before man, fixed, stopped, available for 
the human subject who would possess a representation of it. This will be 
the mark of modernity. (SOR 307) 
Perhaps missing--or perhaps, in this paraphrase, assuming--the prevalence of the 
sub-iectum as such (which only at a certain time happens to become man), 
Derrida is able to use such a phrase as “the Cartesian or Cartesian-Hegelian epoch  
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of the subiectum” (SOR 308). And while this phrase is, no doubt, ambiguous, 
there is a strong sense in which we can hear Derrida, in this phrase, equating the 
sub-iectum (which, in general, is anything that lies before) with the particular 
version of it that Heidegger very explicitly identifies with the event of man and 
modernity. In this way, Derrida may miss--and, at the least, he de-emphasises--an 
important aspect of the historicality of Heidegger’s account, which is not strictly 
an account of the history of being itself, but more accurately of the way, the event, 
in which being has been taken, metaphysically, in modernity. In that way, in that 
event, “Man comes to be the self-posited ground and measure for all certitude 
and truth” (N4 90).xii What is, therefore, critical is Heidegger’s answer to the 
question of what it means for man, in particular, among all the possible beings, to 
become the sub-iectum--to become the only subject, in a certain event or change. 
And this is the question, raised above, of what “in keeping with it [the change], is 
the essence of the modern age.” As we will be able to guess by now, this essence is 
the world as picture: 
. . . world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of 
the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its 
entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in 
being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. 
(AWP 129-130; 89) 
. . . “to represent” [vorstellen]: to set out before oneself and to set forth in 
relation to oneself. Through this, whatever is comes to a stand as object and 
in that way alone receives the seal of Being. That the world becomes 
picture is one and the same event with the event of man’s becoming 
subiectum in the midst of that which is. (AWP 132; 92) 
So, in a sense, it matters little whether we use the Latinate term “representation” 
or the Germanic term Vor-stellung to name this event (this difference being one of 
the bases of Derrida’s argument for critical differences and divisions). For it’s 
clear now that what Heidegger is thinking is that, first of all, regardless of its  
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subsequent incarnation as “representation,” “picturing,” Vorstellung, or 
whatever, sub-iectum captures a way of thinking of “standing before” in the 
general senses of (1) primacy and of (2) something standing before (in front of) 
something else to which everything is given. Then, subsequently, in the event of 
modernity, it happens, as a change and perhaps as a chance, that it is man (and no 
longer, say, the Platonic Greeks’ eidos or the “God” of the Middle Ages) that 
comes to stand before all other beings as his own “objects.” Sub-iectum as such: 
“The word names that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything 
onto itself” (AWP 128; 88). Then the characteristically modern inflection of the 
sub-iectum: here this lying-before becomes Vor-stellung, the idea that what is 
stands before man-the-subject as what he re-presents. “Here to represent [vor-
stellen] means to bring what is present at hand [das Vorhandene] before oneself 
as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing 
it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm” 
(AWP 131; 91). 
 
In a crucial sense, a sense that has to do with the path of thinking, the terms 
simply do not matter. There is an event in history when man becomes the ground 
on which everything that is is. This is the event we might also call “modernity” or 
“the advent of culture” and which effectively reduces the world to the domain of 
beings (the ontic domain)--of which man is both one and the supreme one--and so 
effectively obliterates the question of being as such (the ontological domain) for 
modern metaphysics. To be able to think ontologically, then, as Levinas says in 
his reading of Being and Time, would be to think outside the ontic and, therefore, 
outside the field of representation or, perhaps, outside the frame of the (world) 
picture. Metaphysics, in Heidegger’s positive sense and by contrast with what 
passes in modernity as metaphysics, is ontological thinking: an untimely thinking, 
a thinking out of its age and, for that reason, a thinking-out of its age. 
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How does Levinas read Heidegger’s early thinking (in Being and Time) as leading 
beyond representation? We have already seen the seeds of this in the passage 
from Levinas quoted earlier: from the advent of modernity “the thinking 
substance will not have to reunite with extended substance; it will recover that 
extended substance within itself” (MHO 12). What Levinas finds in this respect, in 
the version that arises in Being and Time, is that what is crucial to the particular 
kind of setting-before of representation (Vor-stellung) is what it is that sets 
everything before it: man as the kind of being that is the thinking substance. What 
Levinas also finds in Being and Time, by contrast, that leads us to a radical 
counter-position to this agonising reflection, characteristic of modernity, on the 
configuration and play between internality and externality, subjectivity and 
objectivity, man and world, is a completely distinct account of man’s being in the 
world that, crucially, refuses to begin with such representationalist divisions. 
Instead, it begins with finitude and finite existence: “Finitude will become the 
very principle of the subject’s subjectivity. It is because there is a finite existence--
Dasein--that consciousness itself will be possible” (MHO 18). That is, the 
condition of finitude--later, for Levinas, “finitude and nothingness” which are 
“defined for Heidegger by ‘effectivity’ [effectivité] (Faktizität)” (MHO 24)xiii--
precedes and makes possible any consideration of consciousness, the thinking 
substance; that is, it is the condition that grounds and makes possible every 
account of “man,” including the representational account itself. It is only because 
of finitude, then, that it is at all possible to picture a world in which everything 
that is is an object for man-as-subject. In a phrase, the sub-iectum (that which has 
primacy and stands before) of Being and Time is Dasein as finitude. 
 
Moreover, this condition of finitude is realised not by man-as-subject in relation to 
objects but, instead, by virtue of “the things in the middle of which Dasein 
effectively lives.” And these are “above all, objects of care, of solicitude 
[sollicitude] (das Besorgte), of handling [maniement) (Umgang)” (MHO 19). In  
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finitude, it is use--“the handling of the tool”--and not consciousness that gives us 
access to the tool. Levinas describes this as “movement” and he goes on: 
But the movement gains access to objects not only in an original way but 
also in an originary way; the movement does not follow upon a 
representation. It is by that above all that Heidegger is opposed to the 
current opinion--an opinion still shared by Husserl himself--namely, that 
the representation of what is handled precedes the handling itself. Tools 
are thus objects that Dasein reveals by a given mode of its existence--
handling. Tools are not then simply “things.” Handling is in some way the 
affirmation of their being. Handling determines not what tools are but the 
manner in which they encounter Dasein, the manner in which they are. The 
being of tools is “handlability” [maniabilité] (Zuhandenheit). And it is 
precisely because handling does not follow upon a representation that 
handlability is not a simple “presence” [présence] (Vorhandenheit) on 
which a new property is grafted. Handlability is entirely irreducible. (MHO 
19-20) 
This insight of Levinas’s is crucial to any reading of Heidegger, early or late. For 
here is the source of the critique of representational thinking. It is Dasein’s 
structure of handlability which arises from its primary condition of finitude that 
speaks against the world-as-picture, in the first place, even from the time of Being 
and Time. This is the ground on which all counter-representationalist arguments 
(against Descartes, against Kant and, ultimately, against Nietzsche) are mounted. 
It is because of finitude’s handlability (or “equipmentality”) that man’s being-in-
the-world cannot be primordially representationalist or picturing/picturable. 
Rather it is handling/handlable. 
 
What is perhaps even more critical to Levinas’s account--and here we return to 
Derridean territory--is the term he uses to describe the structure of this 
equipmentality: “What is the structure of this ‘handlability’? It is essentially  
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constituted by ‘referral’ [renvoi] (Verweisung)” (MHO 20).xiv Now we can, at last, 
see one possible meaning of Derrida’s envois as always repeated, as renvois 
(“referrals” or “re-sendings”).xv And, close to the peak of his critique of 
Heidegger’s envoi (as Geschick), he offers the following incredibly lucid 
description of the renvois and, in the process, of his own metaphysical position as 
a whole: 
Everything begins by referring back (par le renvois), that is to say, does not 
begin; and once this breaking open or this partition divides, from the very 
start, every renvoi, there is not a single renvoi but from then on, always, a 
multiplicity of renvois, so many different traces referring back to other 
traces and to traces of others. This divisibility of the envoi has nothing 
negative about it, it is not a lack, it is altogether different from subject, from 
signifier, or that letter which Lacan says that it does not withstand partition 
and that it always reaches its destination. This divisibility or this differance 
is the condition for there being an envoi, possibly even an envoi of being, a 
dispensation or a gift of being and time, of the present and of 
representation. These renvois of traces or these traces of renvois do not 
have the structure of representatives or of representations, or of signifiers, 
nor of symbols, nor of metaphors, nor of metonymies, etc. But as these 
renvois from the other and to the other, these traces of differance, are not 
original and transcendental conditions on the basis of which philosophy 
traditionally tries to derive effects, subdeterminations, or even epochs, it 
cannot be said for example that representative (or signifying or symbolic, 
etc.) structure befalls them; we shall not be able to assign periods or have 
some epoch of representation follow upon these renvois. As soon as there 
are renvois, and it is always already, something like representation no 
longer waits and we must perhaps arrange to tell this story differently, 
from renvois of renvois to renvois of renvois, in a destiny which is never 
certain of gathering itself up, of identifying itself, or of determining itself (I  
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do not know whether this can be said with or without Heidegger, and it 
does not matter). (SOR 324-25) 
Is it possible that this non-ground, this condition which is a non-transcendental 
condition, which Derrida finds--possibly with and possibly without Heidegger, 
though certainly with his help--and which motivates both his own “outside” to 
representation as well as his questioning of Heidegger’s “outside,” arises as the 
very “structure” of handlability which enables that move and that critique in the 
first place? If so, then this renvoi--though we must, since we are still only 
questioning, say “these renvois”--for Levinas, is/are the key to the critique of the 
simple-presence-before-man that lies at the heart of deconstruction, including the 
deconstruction (SOR 322) of the Heideggerian critique of representation in the 
“Envoi.” And, even against Heidegger’s later critique of technology, Levinas 
positions this renvoi as follows: 
The tool is always “in view of” [en vue de] something, because it is not a 
separate entity, but always in tandem with other tools. Its mode of being 
entails giving precedence to the totality of the function [oeuvre] in relation 
to which the tool exists [est]. The tool is efficient in its role, and handlability 
characterizes its being “in itself” [en soi]; it exists uniquely in its role in the 
case where handlability is not explicitly present but recedes into the 
background, and the tool is understood in terms of its function. This 
function is itself instrumental: the shoe exists in order to be worn, the 
watch in order to tell the time. But, on the other hand, the productive 
function makes use of something in view of something else. What is 
handlable then refers back to materials. We thus discover Nature, forests, 
waters, metals, mountains, winds, etc. But Nature discovered in such a way 
is entirely relative to handling: these are “raw materials” [matières 
premières]. We do not have a forest but wood, waters are hydroelectric 
power, the mountain is a quarry, wind is wind in the sail. (MHO 20)xvi  
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Here--again maybe with, maybe without Heidegger--Levinas’s referral (renvoi) 
“back to materials” opens up the structure of finitude as always referring, 
ceaselessly to an other lying outside any particular being. This is the Derridean 
structure of the supplement: the requirement that any “pure” being always be less 
and more than itself--in its division from and dependence upon an other outside 
it--in order for it to be what it is. No pure forest as such “in nature,” always the 
wood to which it refers forward and which refers back to it. No pure waters but 
rather the hybrid technological formation of the hydroelectric plant which 
becomes its prosthetic. And, with Heidegger, .” . . no such thing as a man who, 
solely, is only man” (QCT 31). 
 
Moreover this account of the renvoi even squares, in Levinas’s reading of 
Heidegger, with the important Derridean realisation (mentioned above regarding 
the case of the Lacanian letter) that not all sendings are guaranteed to arrive. 
Because sendings are handlings and because sendability is handlability 
(remembering, for example, that mail that is sent, whether or not it arrives, is 
nothing without its handling), there is always the possibility that it will go astray, 
that the tool will not work, that the hammer will break. Interestingly enough, for 
Levinas, it is under these circumstances that the tool changes its status for us in 
terms of its, and our, being in the world: 
We have emphasized that the tool is lost in some way within the function 
which it serves; it is thus that it exists in itself. However, when the tool is 
damaged, it stands out against the system in relation to which it exists [est] 
and loses its character of being a tool, so to speak, in order to become, in a 
certain way, a simple presence. In this momentary loss of handlability, the 
“referral in view of which the tool exists” [renvoi à ce en vue de quoi 
l’ustensile est], is achieved. It awakens, stands out, comes to light. And we 
are turned in that manner toward the totality of the system of referrals--a 
totality always implicitly understood but not till then emphasized. Here is  
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a series of referrals which can only be realized in an “in-view-of-which” 
which is no longer in view of some other thing but in view of itself. We 
recognize Dasein itself in this structure. Put another way, understanding of 
the tool only comes about in relation to an initial understanding of Dasein’s 
structure, which, in virtue of the “referral to itself” [renvoi à soi-même] 
proper to Dasein, allows a glimpse within the things themselves of their 
handlability, their possible usage, their “in-view-of.” (MHO 20) 
If we were to read this into the Derridean account of sending and the essential 
possibility of adestination (adestinality), we would see that, peculiarly, when the 
letter (as just one kind of equipment) works normally--when it arrives as 
expected--it is in fact “lost.” Its ordinary working places it beneath the horizon of 
our noticing it as a particular kind of presence. Then, by contrast, when it fails to 
arrive as expected (when, as a tool, it fails to work), it stands out against the 
system of referrals (renvois), it loses its character (of being “lost” within that 
system), so to become “a simple presence.” When it works, it is lost (a lost letter). 
When it is lost in the post, and so doesn’t work, it stands out as a presence-at-
hand (remembering that Levinas is contrasting Zuhandenheit with 
Vorhandenheit in terms of “handlability” and “presence” when we might now 
speak of the distinction between “readiness-to-hand” and “presence-to-
hand”).xvii And while this may be underplayed in the Derridean account of 
sending and (failure of) arrival, or of handling and of the tool’s being damaged, it 
may be of the utmost importance. But let us let this stand in reserve for a short 
while and move on to another possibility and back to the question concerning 
culture. 
 
Suppose we were to say--too briefly and boldly, for sure--that the whole field of 
handlability, of Dasein’s equipmentality, of maniabilité, of Zuhandenheit, 
grounded on Dasein’s finitude, was co-extensive with the field of culture--not as it 
is thought today via the continuation of representational thinking, but as it might  
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be thought outside representation. This would leave the whole Derridean analytic 
of sending (including adestinality, supplementarity, prosthesis and 
deconstruction) in place as it stands but would ground it, as an account of the 
renvoi essential to all cultural technologies, on the analytic of finitude and 
equipmentality as Dasein’s primordial relation to other beings-in-the-world 
(outside and prior to any representationalist account). In this way cultural 
practice would become the field of what Levinas calls “concrete man”: “It is 
concrete man who appears [now, with Heidegger] at the center of philosophy, 
and in comparison with him, the concept of consciousness is only an abstraction, 
arbitrarily separating consciousness--i.e. illumination as illumination--from 
history and existence” (MHO 24). 
 
This much is, I think, at least one possible upshot of Levinas’s reading of Being 
and Time. To summarise, this would be so in six respects. (1) Levinas reveals the 
grounds on which all subsequent criticisms of representational thinking can be 
levelled by Heidegger against modern metaphysics since Descartes. (2) He shows 
that the envoi that Derrida posits as prior to any idea that representationalism is 
an undifferentiating “totalisation” of modern metaphysics is, as it turns out, the 
same as, or very like, the renvoi at the heart of handlability. Hence (3) Derrida’s 
position is effectively an uptake of Heidegger’s at least to the extent that it can 
only be thought once a representational view has already been countered. (4) In 
this way any deconstructive analysis might be re-grounded in the analytic of 
finitude such that, for example, (5) the working tool or arriving letter is more 
essentially lost than that which fails to work or arrive (and which, by contrast, 
then takes on the secondary ontological status of the present-at-hand 
(Vorhandene)). (6) At least in potentia, this promises to re-open the field of the 
cultural, against all and any representationalist characterisations of it, as the 
domain of equipmentality in its finitude and effectivity. 
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This last characterisation of culture, however, is far from Heidegger’s own. He 
firmly associates the idea of cultural man not with his early considerations of 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world generally, but with the more local event of modernity 
itself. For Heidegger, cultural thinking is a mistaken thinking that leads away 
from questioning of the first rank, that is, from questioning matters in their 
essence. Almost no other way of thinking is so quickly set aside by Heidegger in 
favour of philosophical thinking. For example, he begins “Science and Reflection” 
as follows:xviii 
In keeping with a view now prevalent, let us designate the realm in which 
the spiritual and creative activity of man is carried out with the name 
“culture.” As part of culture, we count science, together with its cultivation 
and organization. Thus science is ranked among the values man prizes and 
toward which, out of a variety of motives, he directs his attention. 
 But so long as we take science only in this cultural sense, we will never be 
able to gauge the scope of its essence [Wesen]. This is equally the case for 
art. Even today we readily name these two together: “art and science.” Art 
is also represented as one sphere of cultural enterprise. But then we 
recognise nothing of its essence. . .. 
 Science is no more a cultural activity of man than is art. (SAR 155-6) 
Accordingly, cultural thinking is always and only the thinking “of man,” the man 
of modernity; it is equivalent to “giv[ing] ourselves up to ordinary notions” (SAR 
156) and turning away from whatever is in its essence. Here, and returning to 
“The Age of the World Picture,” culture, as an “essential phenomenon” of 
modernity, is ranked along with science, technology, art and “the loss of the 
gods” (Entgötterung). In fact, it is fourth on Heidegger’s list after science, 
technology and art: 
A fourth modern phenomenon manifests itself in the fact that human 
activity is conceived and consummated as culture. Thus culture is the 
realization (Verwirklichung) of the highest values, through the nurture and  
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cultivation (Pflege) of the highest goods of man. It lies in the essence of 
culture, as such nurturing, to nurture itself in its turn and thus become the 
politics of culture (Kulturpolitik). (AWP 116; 75-76) 
While Heidegger drops the question of the “essence” of culture at this point, what 
he may be thinking here is that, insofar as culture arises only within the age of 
man’s self-representationality--and as “the highest goods” of so “low” a thinking-
-it, too, no doubt is subject to representing itself. We must guess here, of course, 
but this may help us see why culture’s essence (as nurturing) is to nurture “itself 
in its turn.” In this self-enclosure or self-enframing, and in the consequent 
impossibility of ever reaching out to beings beyond the realm of man’s self-
representation, it becomes confined within what, by 1938, must have seemed to 
Heidegger to be the very lowest of low thoughts: namely politics. A little later 
(1940), in the Nihilism lectures, Heidegger offers us some corroboration of this 
reading when he refers to “The securing of supreme and absolute self-
development of all the capacities of mankind for absolute dominion over the 
entire earth.” This, he says, “is the secret goad that prods modern man again and 
again to new resurgences” (N4 99). Then, at this point, he offers us examples 
which, together, form a very useful chronicle of, precisely, the formations that 
culture (as “the consciously posited binding” of modern man for himself in his 
dominion) has taken since its clearest enunciation in the Enlightenment: 
The consciously posited binding appears in many guises and disguises. The 
binding can be human reason and its law (Enlightenment), or the real, the 
factual, which is ordered and arranged by such reason (Positivism). The 
binding can be a humanity harmoniously joined in all its accomplishments 
and molded into a beautiful figure (the human ideal of Classicism). The 
binding can be the development of the power of self-reliant nations, or the 
“proletariat of all lands,” or individual peoples and races. The binding can 
be the development of humanity in the sense of the progress of universal 
rationality. The binding can also be “the hidden seeds of each individual  
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age,” the development of the “individual,” the organization of the masses, 
or both. Finally [coming to Heidegger’s own times, via Nietzsche], it can be 
the creation of a mankind that finds the shape of its essence neither in 
“individuality” nor in the “mass,” but in the “type.” (N4 99)xix 
No doubt each of these varieties of cultural formation as “consciously posited 
binding” deserves detailed investigation. What is important for us, here, 
however, is that, despite the apparent variety of “ways of being cultural”--a 
variety that sometimes dazzles contemporary cultural theory and, at all times, 
provides the field with its deepest entrenchments and debates--every such way is, 
at ground, a function of modernity and representational thinking. This comes to 
light when, again in the Nihilism lectures, Heidegger makes this connection 
between culture and the representational thinking of modernity even clearer by 
referring to the anachronisms that arise when pre-modern times are thought, 
retrospectively and erroneously, to be cultures: 
And so as soon as valuative thought emerged, there came--and still comes--
the empty talk about the “cultural values” of the Middle Ages and the 
“spiritual values” of antiquity, even though there was nothing like 
“culture” in the Middle Ages nor anything like “spirit” and “culture” in 
ancient times. Only in the modern era have spirit and culture been 
deliberately experienced as fundamental modes of human comportment, 
and only in most recent times have “values” been posited as standards for 
such comportment. It does not follow, of course, that earlier periods were 
“uncultured” in the sense that they were submerged in barbarism; what 
follows is that with the schemata “culture” and “lack of culture,” “spirit,” 
and “value,” we never touch in its essence the history, for example, of the 
Greeks. (N4 17) 
Again, what talk of “culture” does is to remove us from the path of thinking that 
would take us to the essence of, say, history (or science, or art). What it does 
instead is to offer an anachronistic account of essential history, an  
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anthropomorphic account of essential science, an “aestheticist” account of the 
essence of art, and so on. This is what Heidegger means when he says that 
cultural thinking is anthropological: “Thus today one thought is common to 
everyone, to wit, an ‘anthropological’ thought, which demands that the world be 
interpreted in accordance with the image of man and that metaphysics be 
replaced by ‘anthropology’. In such a demand, a definite decision has already 
been rendered concerning the relationship of man to beings as such” (N4 86). And 
that relationship, as Heidegger goes on to show, is precisely Cartesian-
representationalist: it is a relationship in which whatever is becomes an “object” 
for man-as-subject, including among such objects man himself as the being 
(primary sub-iectum) with the capacity for self-representation. 
 
But is not this supposed “capacity for self-representation,” itself, another way of 
putting the idea of culture? Is not culture, in at least one of its many “theoretical” 
manifestations, the idea that men represent men to men (usually of their own 
“kind” or “nation”)? Heidegger’s list of “bindings,” above, surely says as much. 
And if, accordingly, we try to step outside this particular and modern kind of 
thinking of man’s relation to “beings as such,” might we not find, perhaps among 
other things, on the other side of our stepping out, a reconfiguration of culture 
that would be--if not identical with, then--extremely close to the account of 
Dasein’s equipmentality (and ultimately its facticity and finitude)? “Science and 
Reflection” certainly holds out hope for a re-thinking of science outside “cultural” 
thinking and therefore “in its essence”; “The Origin of the Work of Art” holds out 
a similar hope for today’s overly-representationalist (and, therefore, aestheticist) 
mistakes about art;xx and “The Question Concerning Technology,” once again, 
holds out a hope that technology might be re-thought in its origins and away 
from its dominant anthropocentric and instrumentalist readings today. And 
incidentally, while the question of technology is close to hand, let us remember 
that Heidegger at one point equates this field, technology, with that of culture  
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itself: “For technology signifies exactly what ‘culture,’ which is contemporaneous 
with it, also signifies” (N4 40). If there is, then, a questioning concerning 
technology (or more precisely, Technik, technological thinking), why should there 
not be a questioning concerning culture--a questioning that tries to think culture 
in its essence as opposed to representationally, “ordinarily,” within the cognitive 
field of modernity? 
 
But have we not already read Heidegger on the essence of culture? Did he not 
announce it as being that nurturing of the highest values of modern man which 
must eventually nurture itself and so become Kulturpolitik? Yes, this is true. But 
there is also a sense in which culture, above science, technology, art and, perhaps, 
“the loss of the gods,” is, for Heidegger, quintessentially a phenomenon 
(Erscheinung) of modernity and nothing but. When, therefore, he speaks of its 
“essence,” this is always an essence confined to modernity and, so, to 
representational thinking. As opposed to this limit, in posing the question of 
culture in its essence, then, I mean to open the possibility--without the 
anachronistic effect of simply transferring the culture of modernity to previous 
ages or to non-Western peoples--of seeing how culture, too, along with science, 
technology and art, might conceal something more fundamental when thought 
differently: that is, when thought out with its “Heideggerian” positioning as the 
essential thinking of modernity itself. This will lead us eventually to ask whether 
the “nurturing”--or, as the translator puts it, the “nurture and cultivation”--the 
Pflege, of which Heidegger speaks, might not reach outside and beyond the 
confines of a nurturing and cultivation of representational thought by itself and 
for itself. On the way to that thought, we might draw some parallels with the 
problem of technology which, as we have seen, Heidegger practically equates 
with culture. 
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To draw a first parallel with “The Question Concerning Technology,” we can 
notice, among other things, the following.xxi Heidegger is well known for his 
fundamental critique of technologies, especially in “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” but also throughout his middle and later periods. At root, however, 
Heidegger’s aversion is actually reserved for modern technologies, and not for 
technology as such, “in its essence.” He expresses his distaste for the hydroelectric 
plant--Levinas, above, notwithstanding--but not for the fishing hook and, at the 
same time, argues that technology in its essence (as opposed to modern 
technologies) “is a mode of revealing.” That is “[t]echnology comes to presence 
[west] in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where 
alétheia, truth, happens” (QCT 13). But it is this very thinking of technology’s 
essence that has been, Heidegger argues, deleted from our modern technologies, 
making a deep cut or decision between old (authentic) and new (inauthentic) 
modes of thinking. 
 
The “problem” of modern technology, for Heidegger, is the form of revealing that 
it conceals. This is the form of revealing called “Enframing” (Ge-stell), a form 
which technology shares with modern science, albeit that the latter precedes the 
former historically. Enframing “is the gathering together that belongs to that 
setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in 
the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve [Bestand]” (QCT 24). “Standing-
reserve,” here, refers to a thinking of nature’s energy as capable of being stored 
for later use. By contrast with poiésis (bringing-forth) as another and very 
different mode of revealing, science and technology as the revealing that is 
Enframing, are ruled by a “challenging” or “challenging forth” (Herausfordern) 
of nature (QCT 14). This, by contrast with bringing-forth, “puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as 
such” (QT 14). Poiésis, again by contrast, makes no such unreasonable demand. 
Rather it cares for, which is to say “nurtures,” nature. (And here we have our first  
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clue to a possible re-thinking of culture’s own “nurturing and cultivation” outside 
modernity; but this must still wait a while for a fuller consideration.) Hence, for 
now, we must consider the “negative” revealing of science and technology as 
Enframing and challenging in some more depth. 
 
Immediately following the account of challenging as the extraction of energy 
from nature and its storage, Heidegger asks the following question and 
introduces a concrete example: “But does this [the demand for the extraction and 
storage of energy] not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do 
indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the 
windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it” (QCT 
14). The “No,” in this case, is of the utmost importance for Heidegger’s thinking 
of technology. Without this particular turn in the maze of his thinking, the whole 
argument for the distinction between ancient and modern technologies, and with 
it the argument for Enframing as the peculiar characteristic of modern 
technology’s revealing, is in doubt. Without it, the maze goes unsolved. And has 
Levinas not already said that, in the analytic of Dasein’s equipmentality: “We do 
not have a forest but wood, waters are hydroelectric power, the mountain is a 
quarry, wind is wind in the sail”? If this is eternally true for Dasein, as man’s 
“openness for Being” in general, then we might expect it to be as true of the old 
windmill as it is of the hydroelectric plant. Is there not a sense in which, then, the 
old milling techniques are, through and through, matters of the harnessing of 
natural energy for later use? The mill, that is, may be used to grind corn or other 
cereal crops. And what is this corn but the stored energy of the earth, the sun, the 
rain (or the rivers) and, not least, of the farmhand’s labour? Is the corn not then 
set aside, placed in standing reserve, until there is a sufficient (ordered and 
calculable) quantity for milling? And then, in the mill itself, is the wind’s energy 
not harnessed so that grain may be extracted from this standing-reserve of corn, 
and so that the grain itself may be stored up in granaries for later use? And, in the  
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transformation of the grain into, say, bread, is there not a further extraction and 
storage of energy through the technologies of the oven and their dependence on a 
stored and measurable supply of fuel? In all of these “old” processes we find, as it 
were, not so much an absence of Enframing and standing-reserve as the operation 
of referrals (renvois): the bread in the oven refers back, makes a back reference, to 
the store of grain which makes a back reference to the mill and the wind which, 
together, make a back reference to the store of cereal which makes a back 
reference to the earth, the sun, the rain and to labour. Here, then, we begin to 
question the centrality of Enframing (as the kind of revealing that challenges 
forth) as essentially peculiar to modern technologies.xxii 
 
Still it has to be said that technology, thought as Enframing-revealing, has two 
different statuses later in Heidegger’s path of questioning. As a kind of revealing 
at all, it can be the “saving power” and so return us to technology as techné, and 
thence as poiésis, as bringing forth. Only as the Enframing-revealing does 
technology constitute the “supreme danger” in that Enframing is held to be the 
kind of revealing that lets all beings (including man) only ever be revealed as 
standing-reserve and therefore threatens all revealing as such: 
. . . Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself 
and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of 
revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives 
out every other possibility of revealing which, in the sense of poiésis, lets 
what presences come forth into appearance. As compared with that other 
revealing, the setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation 
to that which is, that is at once antithetical and rigorously ordered. Where 
Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve 
mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental 
characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such. (QCT 27)  
 
26 
But, with the case of the old windmill, we have seen that, if even the old 
technologies (and, by extension, even the oldest of them such as the fishing hook) 
extract and store up energy as standing-reserve, then there never is, in any 
technology, “this revealing as such.” Moreover, there is never not ordering or 
calculation: for example the first writings in the cuneiform of the Sumerians 
(which eventually, via many referrals and eventually via the Phoenicians, 
becomes the alphabet of the Greeks themselves), it is now recognised, were ways 
of accounting.xxiii They were used to calculate and order the transportation of 
stored goods (corn, sheep, slaves and so on) from one market to another so as to 
ensure that the goods sent were, as far as possible, adestination notwithstanding, 
identical with the goods that arrived.xxiv That is, the technology of writing itself 
is, from the beginning, a series of renvois, pointing to (Ver-weisen) a standing-
reserve of “natural” energy stored in granaries, herds and colonies, inter alia. 
Then, insofar as technology is a revealing, it is never not an “impure” or 
“contaminated” revealing. If there are never not renvois, then there is never 
“pure” techné, poiésis that is not “technological” in this sense. The essence of 
technology, in whatever age, is this referrability. 
 
For all of this, throughout his work, Heidegger also offers a different but related 
account of “science” (as in natural science) and a slightly different (but also 
related) reason for its “metaphysical” error: science falls away from the true path 
of thinking (metaphysics) insofar as it makes a particular cut or de-cision.xxv In 
reading the whole of physis as limited to “physical nature” and annexing this 
domain to itself, scientific thinking confines itself to the merely ontic-factical 
aspect of physis as a whole. Its decision here (albeit unthought and unthinkable 
by science) is to put the truly ontological side of the ontic-ontological difference to 
one side.xxvi In this respect, today, there can be no such thing as a “science of 
being,” only sciences of particular beings such as atoms, stars and bacteria. 
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By extension of this account--since, as we have seen, technologies today are held 
to rely on the same kind of revealing as science--modern technologies, as the 
ordering of nature as standing-reserve, arise and come to presence in the same 
way as scientific calculation. They exist, then, as a further step away from the 
thinking path towards being. In short, all modern forms of technology are 
instances of merely ontic thinking. They attest to an inauthenticity of all modern 
beings towards the truth of their being and, in this sense, they could not be 
further removed from technology “in its essence” as the realm where truth (as 
unconcealment or “true” revealing) happens. 
 
Note then that the problem of technology can be seen to arise from a decision of 
Heidegger’s about how to treat a decision of science’s. The first decision cuts 
modern (inauthentic) technology away from something else, presumably its more 
authentic pre-scientific form. (Homeric poetic making might be one such pre-
scientific form.) But--because, as we have seen, it may be impossible to separate 
ancient from modern technologies on the grounds that only the latter are 
instances of Enframing--this assumes that a moral (normative/evaluative) 
decision must come either in advance of, or simultaneously with, a metaphysical 
decision: a decision about the moral inauthenticity of the merely ontic in thinking 
comes with, that is, a decision in the natural sciences and in modern technological 
thinking to confine themselves to the merely ontic. And what this cuts away, in 
advance, is the possibility of thinking a general condition of all technology 
(whether “in its essence” or in its modern manifestations) as the sheer 
equipmentality or having ready-to-hand of Dasein that we have encountered in 
Levinas’s reading of Being and Time. In that earlier work, as we saw, the 
investigation of the understanding of being leads inevitably to a picture of 
Dasein’s understanding as essential equipmentality or handlability which, in its 
turn, always refers back to referral (renvoi, Verweisung) as its structural 
condition. Moving back to that thought, then, we might begin to see how  
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technology and, therefore, culture as such is the “making” we encounter in that 
domain of physis in which beings arise and come to presence through human 
making (rather than on their own account). And as support for this possibility we 
might refer, again, to “The Age of the World Picture” where Heidegger, himself 
thinking back to Being and Time, states: 
The concept of world [der Weltbegriff] as it is developed in Being and Time 
is to be understood only from within the horizon of the question 
concerning “openness for Being” [Da-sein], a question that, for its part, 
remains closely conjoined with the fundamental question concerning the 
meaning of Being (not with the meaning of that which is). (AWP 141; 100) 
All of this, then, mutatis mutandis, could be equally true for culture--with a single 
exception. That is, while technological thinking emerges in a very direct relation 
to scientific thinking (at least in a certain sense), this cannot be the case for 
cultural thinking. On the contrary, we have already seen how, in “Science and 
Reflection” the mistake is to count science as part of culture.xxvii In order for this 
particular trope of modern anthropologism to occur, cultural thinking would 
have to have its origin completely outside scientific thinking as such. In this case, 
we might say that just as scientific thinking begins by thinking only of natural 
objects (physical nature) as the whole of physis, so cultural thinking makes the 
parallel mistake of thinking only of synthetic or man-made objects (“technical” 
nature) as all there can possibly be. These mistakes are similar but have vastly 
different consequences for the two fields in question. Whereas scientism, for 
example, might reduce all human activity to its biological or physiological bases 
as a consequence of its mistaken cutting of physis, culturalism (as per the opening 
of “Science and Reflection”) tends in the opposite direction by trying to argue 
that, when the scientist sees only a biological or physiological organism when he 
considers a man, what he is actually seeing is an effect of the specific cultural 
conventions of science. In this way such thinking as the relativistic philosophy of 
science can emerge, as well as talk of the “social construction” of scientific  
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worldviews, paradigms and so on. If this is what Heidegger means by “culture”--
a reduction of everything to “the spiritual and creative activity of man”--then he 
is surely right to criticise culturalist forms of thinking. 
 
On the other hand, just as technology can ultimately be rethought as a matter of 
techné onta (things which arise and come to presence in man’s care and 
nurturing), culture most immediately can be re-thought as cultura which had, for 
the Romans, the sense of caring for and nurturing initially plants (cultura agri) 
and, eventually, the mind and the intelligence (cultura animi).xxviii The term 
translates the Greek paideía (παιδεια). This stems from paîs (παισ): a child (in the 
family sense, a son or a daughter); a child (in relation to age or stage of life); the 
legal issue (of animals); a slave or servant (man or maid). The Oxford has an entry 
for the anglicised version of this term, “pædeia”: 
In ancient Greek society: education or upbringing; more gen., a society’s 
culture; the sum of physical and intellectual achievement to which the 
human body and mind can aspire. [Then in a particular cited use of the 
term:] “The sum total of all ideal perfections of mind and body.” 
Now while it would be easy enough to set upon the use of the word “culture” in 
this definition, this would block any deeper thinking. For if we turn to Liddel and 
Scott, we find that paideía refers, for the Greeks, primarily to rearing, bringing 
up, nurturing.xxix It means, certainly, the rearing of a child and so training and 
teaching, what we would now call education out of the Latin educare, “I lead 
out.” But whereas the Latin and the English contain the sense that something lies 
“within,” already, that must subsequently be led out, the Greek has more the 
sense of caring for and nurturing the being. Yet that nurturing is by no means 
“indulgent” (what we would now, perhaps, call “child-centred”) for paideía also 
means chastisement (in the service of good breeding and proper conduct). This 
“in the service of” is so critical that paideía is also the result of rearing and 
training: mental “culture,” learning. It is anything taught or learned: art, science,  
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medicine. There is no split here between “means” and “ends”: in this sense, 
Heidegger’s view that causality in the modern sense by no means applies to 
Greek thinking is correct. Hence paideía can also be what it is that is nurtured: 
youth, childhood and (in the collective sense) a body of youths. We must think 
paideía, then, as nurturing in a primary sense: as both a sending of a being on its 
way and as the way that it is sent upon; as well as what it is (the being) that is so 
sent. And we must say “a being,” meaning “any being” (not just a human child), 
because, even in Greek times, the word paideía refers also to the cultivation and 
care of trees as well as, perhaps more rarely and obscurely, ropes of papyrus, “the 
twisted handiwork of Egypt.”xxx 
 
Paideía, then, as the sending forth towards (adulthood, fruition or whatever 
“destination”), is extremely close to the senses of envoi and renvoi. Renvoi 
(Levinas, Derrida) is a continual re-sending and translates the German 
Verweisung (Heidegger). 
 
Thought as paideía, however, Ver-weisung sits within every action related to 
weisen, to point, to impart instruction by showing.xxxi  Verweisen is primarily to 
refer but also to relegate (say, to second place) and, in terms of the paideía not 
working, it is also to send out, to expel (for example, from school); and this sense 
of the verb is most clearly captured by the word-family member ausweisen. 
Verweisen is also to direct or refer a person to someone as an authority, and, as 
well, to direct or refer someone’s attention to something. One related verb is 
wegweisen, to point the way; hence Wegweiser (signpost). The word-family 
obviously has a sense of directing elsewhere (either towards growth and fruition 
or else towards banishment and lostness--the result cannot be decided in 
advance). This is most aptly captured by hinweisen, to direct (someone) there, to 
show the way there, to indicate, to draw (someone’s) attention to, to point there 
(as of a signpost). And, assuming the arrival is successful, we get nachweisen, to  
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prove, to establish and hence the noun Nachweisung, reference, information. 
Then, once again approaching paideía itself, we find anweisen, to give directions, 
instructions, orders; to assign, allocate, allot. Then, perhaps, reaching paideía 
itself, we find unterweisen, to instruct and die Unterweisung, instruction.  
 
Cultural thinking, then, might be re-configured as “paedetics,” the understanding 
of the field of Dasein’s equipmentality (its manner, ways and techniques) insofar 
as this field has to do with the particular task of bringing beings out--through a 
pointing out, a sending of them along their way, towards a destination that may 
or may not be reached.xxxii 
 
I, for one, do not know if such a re-thinking of culture is possible. But it does seem 
clear that, in its absence, we are left, in today’s cultural disciplines and cultural 
“sciences” with little more than idle chatter about world pictures and their 
currently fashionable theoretical equivalents which, if Heidegger is right, are no 
more than forms of testimony to an event through which we happen, still, to be 
living: namely, modernity, the age of the world-as-picture. In this case, all the 
cultural disciplines could do would be to repeat the condition of their own event: 
ceaselessly picturing pictures. For example, cultural studies continues to 
investigate the veracity or otherwise of the “representation” of one sector or 
another of society in one cultural medium or another. Semiotics and critical 
linguistics continue to debate the adequacy of particular signs in terms of their 
significatory and social effects as representations. Media studies, too, tells us that 
the age of the word is over and that the age of the image is coming to replace it: 
but this supposed change itself only bears witness to the continuation of 
modernity. Meanwhile anthropologists continue to do “fieldwork” on what they 
imagine to be, by virtue of their involvement in the event of modernity, 
“cultures”; that what they investigate may not even be such cannot occur to them, 
for such a reflection is itself, essentially, un-anthropological. Historical research,  
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too, goes on into the world pictures of all sorts of ancient civilisations--again 
regardless of the fact that only a fundamental anachronism allows them to be 
pictured this way; which is to say, pictured at all. No doubt countless other 
instances could be brought to bear from everywhere within the range and breadth 
of the humanities and social sciences. 
 
And, though by now it may be too late (for this paper and for those of us still with 
an interest in culture and its meaning), this returns us to the fundamental 
importance for our times of Heidegger’s opening remarks which I shall repeat 
here: 
In metaphysics reflection [die Besinnung] is accomplished concerning the 
essence [das Wesen] of what is [des Seienden] and a decision [eine 
Entscheidung] takes place regarding the essence of truth [das Wesen der 
Wahrheit]. Metaphysics grounds an age [ein Zeitalter], in that through a 
specific interpretation of what is [eine bestimmte Auslegung des Seienden] 
and through a specific comprehension of truth [eine bestimmte Auffassung 
der Wahrheit] it gives to that age the basis [Grund] upon which it is 
essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the 
phenomena [Erscheinungen] that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order 
that there may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena 
themselves, the metaphysical basis for them must let itself be apprehended 
in them. Reflection is the courage [der Mut] to make the truth of our own 
presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most 
deserve to be called in question. (AWP 115; 75) 
It is perhaps at this point that we can see the critical relevance of this passage for 
us today. What it tells us, among other things, is that, firstly, the basis upon which 
our age, the age of modernity, is essentially formed is the metaphysics of 
representation--and nor are we out of it. A reflection has been accomplished and a 
de-cision (a cut) has taken place such that the essence of truth, today, as for  
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several centuries before, is that what is (what we call “objects” and “things”) is 
always an effect of, and that which is made to stand before, man as the 
representing being (what we call a “subject” or a “consciousness”). This, above all, 
effects the way we think about (for sure, who we are, but also, and by extension, 
about) what can be. And this is the announcement of our limits. 
 
All of this overtakes and has precedence over any version or vision of the world 
that we might want to picture within those limits. But at the same time, we owe it 
to ourselves that, at least from time to time, we should stop--not for a moment, 
but seriously stop--and reflect on these limits and wonder whether we can begin 
to think outside them. That reflection (die Besinnung)--and here the buck stops--
would itself be an instance of metaphysics, though not necessarily of the 
dominant metaphysics of our age. The word that describes our ability to stop and 
reflect (in the sense of the passage just re-quoted) and, thereby, to engage (in) 
metaphysics, is “courage” [der Mut]. The question now is whether we--and only 
those still immersed in a certain kind of representational thinking would ask 
“What do you mean by ‘We’?”--have that courage. 
 
If that courage is there then we might begin with the following questions: 
 
What need of “postmodernity,” let alone “postmodernism,” when clearly there 
has not yet been a counter-modernity and no signs of it on the horizon? 
 
What need of moves “against metaphysics” when clearly it’s a metaphysical 
investigation that we need, precisely as reflection? 
 
Why the currently fashionable trend against “realism” and “essentialism” when 
it’s precisely the question of the real--or, more correctly, of being--and its essence  
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(Wesen) that the cultural disciplines need to confront and simply can’t do so in 
their current configurations--for all their talk of “theory”? 
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